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The commercial speech doctrine has had a major impact on drug
regulation. This Article highlights two key current issues that illustrate
this impact.' Part I of this Article will discuss the constitutionality of a
tailored safety-moratorium on television advertisements for drugs
with a high risk potential. Part II will discuss the constitutionality of
imposing limitations on drug manufacturers' ability to distribute med-
ical journal article reprints that discuss new but unapproved uses for
drugs. This Article maintains that the safety risks to the public rightly
deserve great weight under the commercial speech doctrine.
PART I. SAFETY MORATORIUM ON DRUG
TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENTS
While the law requires "adequate and well-controlled investiga-
tions" 2 before the US Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approves
new drugs, the studies do not always account for risks that only be-
come apparent once the drugs are administered to the general popula-
tion. Patients also may have health conditions not considered during
testing that lead to more side effects. The seriousness of the problem
with post-approval risks was highlighted when Vioxx, a pain treat-
ment for arthritis, was found to increase cardiovascular problems in a
t Professor of Law (Retired), Seton Hall Law School; J.D., Columbia Law
School. I served in the Office of the Chief Counsel for the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration from 1975 to 1981.
1 For a detailed analysis of related topics on commercial speech and drug
regulation, see Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Safety and Commercial Speech: Television
Advertisements and Reprints on Off-Label Uses, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 845 (2010)
[hereinafter Drug Safety]. See also Margaret Gihooley, Constitutionalizing Food and
Drug Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 815 (2000) [hereinafter Constitutionalizing]; Margaret
Gilhooley, Drug Regulation and the Constitution After Western States, 37 U. RICH. L.
REV. 901 (2003).
2 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)-(e) (2006).
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study done after it was on the market. 3 To help prevent similar situa-
tions arising in the future, Congress authorized the agency to develop
a post-market electronic surveillance program of Medicare records
and, when available, private insurance company records.4 The FDA
can use the surveillance data to identify undiscovered risks after a
drug becomes available for public use.s Congress also expanded the
agency's authority to require warnings and additional drug testing to
assess further any newly discovered risks.6 Congress also considered
imposing a moratorium on direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertisements
until the post-approval risks could be assessed by FDA's surveillance
and follow-up testing.'
The moratorium was not enacted, though, with Senator Kennedy
explaining that some senators had concerns about its constitutionali-
ty.8 While a tailored moratorium has merit, as discussed below, that
position will be open to debate, and Congress may not be willing to
adopt a moratorium.
A. Scope and Rationale for a Tailored Moratorium
A moratorium could take two forms. The most difficult constitu-
tional issues would arise if Congress were to enact a categorical mora-
torium on advertisements for all newly-approved drugs until post-
approval surveillance is completed. A more limited ban would "tailor"
the moratorium to include only the drugs that cause the greatest con-
cerns to safety.
Identifying tailoring criteria would require medical and scientific
expertise, but potential moratorium candidates would seem to be those
drugs for which "risk signals" of serious adverse effects are seen in
3 See Alice Dembner, Maker Takes Vioxx Off Market, Heart Risk Known
Earlier Some Say, Bos. GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2004, at Al.
4 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (k)(3)-(4) (2010); Drug Safety, supra note 1, at 864-
65.
5 See Drug Safety, supra note 1, at 864-65.
6 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(F) (2010) (warnings); id. § 355(o)(3)(B) (addi-
tional studies); Margaret Gilhooley, Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of
Testing, Risk Signals, Preemption and the Drug Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV.
347, 363-65 (2008) [hereinafter Potential Drug Risks].
For FDA's position on DTC advertising, see FDA, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS (1999), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliancerRgulatorylnformation/G
uidances/ucm070065.pdf.
153 CONG. REC. S5755 (daily ed. May 9, 2007) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy); see Drug Safety, supra note 1, at 866.
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pre-approval testing, as occurred with Vioxx. 9 Cardiovascular effects
were seen in the pre-approval testing for Vioxx, but a larger study was
needed to provide evidence of the link.'o The moratorium could also
be appropriate for a new therapeutic drug class with a novel mechan-
ism of action, as well as drugs used to treat patients with serious
health conditions who might be at special risk if the drug posed unex-
pected problems.' 1 For example, if a drug were for those who have
already suffered a heart attack, there might be special concern for the
consequences of unexpected adverse health effects. These patients
have already demonstrated that they are vulnerable to an adverse
health condition. Finally, if experts believe that there is substantial
scientific uncertainty about the potential for additional risks that could
affect public safety, a moratorium on DTC advertising for that drug
should be considered.
Congress or the FDA should establish dispute procedures if the
decision to place a moratorium on a specific drug is challenged. Such
procedures could be modeled after those that govern challenges to
FDA requests to conduct additional drug testing before approval.12
B. Western States and Advertisement Restrictions
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Thompson v. Western
States Medical Centerl3 is the leading case that sets forth the appro-
priate application of the commercial speech doctrine to drug regula-
tion. Western States raised questions about the constitutional viability
of a moratorium, since the Court recognized the need to consider addi-
tional disclosure statements as an alternative to speech restrictions.14
The dissent, though, warned against "an overly rigid 'commercial
speech' doctrine" for government decisions that affect "health and
safety."' 5
9 See generally Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx's History and the Need for Better
Procedures and Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941 (2007) (providing a
regulatory history of Vioxx).
10 See Potential Drug Risks, supra note 6, at 356-57.
' See Drug Safety, supra note 1, at 872-74.
12 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(F) (Supp. 11 2006).
13 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
14 See id. at 375.
15 Id. at 389. See Drug Safety, supra note 1, at 868-71, for a more complete
description of the differences between the majority and dissent's analysis.
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1. Commercial Speech Test
The parties agreed that the advertising for the compounded drugs
was commercial speech rather than fully-protected speech.16 The first
prong of the commercial speech test permits restrictions on speech
that is unlawful activity or is misleading, but the government did not
assert that this prong applied.17 Under the remaining prong, to restrict
speech, the government must show that there is a substantial govern-
ment interest, which would be directly advanced by the restriction,
and that the restriction is not more extensive than necessary.
a. Identifying a Substantial Government Interest
Western States concerned pharmacists who made "compounded"
variations of FDA-approved drugs for patients with unique needs.' 9
For example, pharmacists can make a drug without an ingredient to
which the patient has an allergy, or make the drug in liquid form in-
stead of a pill to permit easier swallowing. The FDA recognized the
interest in serving individual needs but expressed concerns that phar-
macies would compound untested variations of a drug on a large
scale. As a result, Congress found consumer advertising of specific
compounded drugs to be inappropriate, although pharmacies could
advertise the availability of compounding services.2 o According to the
Court, the government believed there was a substantial interest in pre-
serving the integrity of the new drug approval system while balancing
the need for compounds to meet individual needs. 2 1 The government
argued that an advertisement restriction would help to differentiate
when compounding became a guise for manufacturing unapproved
drugs on a large scale. 22
b. More Extensive than Necessary and Advertising Restrictions
The agency in Western States, however, failed to show that the
speech restriction would not be more extensive than necessary. Justice
O'Connor found the advertisement ban to be excessive because the
government failed to demonstrate why a ban on the use of large-scale
manufacturing equipment or a cap on profits would not be an ade-
16 W. States Med Ctr., 535 U.S. at 366.
17 See id at 368.
See id.
See id. at 360-61.
20 Id at 370-71.
21 id.
22 See id. at 368-69.
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quate alternative to an advertising ban. 23 She emphasized that an ad-
vertisement restriction must be a "necessary as opposed to a merely
convenient means" because "[i]f the First Amendment means any-
thing," speech restrictions "must be a last-not first-resort." 24
2. Dissent's Commercial Speech Analysis and Role of
Disclaimers
In dissent, Justice Breyer identified another substantial interest in
prohibiting these advertisements. 25 According to magazine articles
discussed in the dissent, DTC television advertisements for approved
drugs pressure doctors to prescribe these drugs. 26 Justice Breyer in-
ferred that similar advertisements for compounded drugs would also
create patient demand that might pressure doctors to write more pre-
scriptions for the unapproved variations. 27 The effect could lead to an
increased safety risk resulting from the increased use of unapproved
variations.
In reply, Justice O'Connor objected to the dissent's "hypothesized
justification" for the ban because the government had not advanced
it.2 8 Furthermore, she disagreed with Justice Breyer's support, criticiz-
mg the weak evidence from the magazines that doctors would be pres-
sured. 29 Justice O'Connor stated that a ban on consumer advertise-
ments amounted to "a fear that people would make bad decisions if
given truthful information."30 If the government feared that consumers
might be confused about the risks of a compounded drug, this concern
could be addressed by introducing a disclaimer on the drug's label
that the compound "had not undergone FDA testing and its risk were
unknown."31
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, maintained that the commercial
speech test needs "a more lenient application . . . that reflects the need
23 Id. at 372 (delivering the majority opinion for the court).
24 Id. at 373. See Drug Safety, supra note 1, at 867-71, for a fuller discussion
of the commercial speech doctrine.
25 W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 383-84.
26 id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 373-74.
Id. at 374. See Drug Safety, supra note 1, at 868-71, for a fuller discussion
of the differences between Justices O'Connor and Breyer on the application of the
commercial speech test in Western States. See id. at 874-75 for FDA findings on the
impact the ads can have on doctors.
o W. States, 535 U.S. at 374 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 503 (1996)).
1 Id. at 376.
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for distinctions . . . among forms of regulation." 3 2 "Otherwise," he
continued, "an overly rigid 'commercial speech' doctrine will trans-
form what ought to be a legislative or regulatory decision about the
best way to protect the health and safety of the American public into a
",33Constitutional decision ....
C. DTC Moratorium after Western States
1. Scope of Potential Safety Risk
The safety rationale for a DTC advertisement moratorium has a
stronger safety basis than that presented in Western States. As pre-
viously noted, the pre-market testing for approved drugs is not suffi-
cient to identify the full range of risks that may be present when the
drug is administered to the public. A moratorium would permit doc-
tors and the agency to assess the scope of these risks before deciding
if additional precautions are needed. A tailored moratorium would be
directed at the drugs for which the risk potential is the greatest.34
The DTC moratorium is also aimed at avoiding wide-scale safety
risks.35 Television drug advertisements reach a broad audience. Con-
sequently, post-approval safety risks could affect a large number of
users. The potential for harm from a nationally-advertised drug goes
beyond the aggregate one considered in Western States from drugs
compounded by pharmacies to meet special needs. Unlike the perma-
nent advertisement ban considered in Western States, the DTC mora-
torium is for a temporary period while surveillance is underway to
detect additional risks.
2. Impact of Advertisements on Doctors
Western States criticized the dissent's reliance on magazine sur-
veys to show that consumer advertisements pressure doctors. FDA has
done more surveys of doctors about the advertisements and this could
be important data in any future litigation. 3 6 In light of Western States,
though, the key consideration is likely to be whether a disclaimer in
the DTC advertisements is a sufficient alternative. The risk of any
disclaimer is that it will seem like boilerplate to consumers.
The overall effect of the advertisement is likely to be to invite
viewers to seek prescriptions from their doctors. However, it does so
32 Id. at 389.
34 See supra Part L.A for a summary of potential risk criteria.
3s See Drug Safety, supra note 1, at 876.
36 See id. at 874-75.
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at a time when the doctor does not have an adequate basis for assess-
ing the drug's risk37 because the agency is still in the process of con-
ducting its post-approval surveillance. When the risk surveillance and
assessment are still underway, there is merit to leaving the matter to
the agency and to the doctor's professional assessment without the
pressure that comes from television advertisements. Courts should
recognize that public safety concerns should outweigh advertising
interests during this period. The commercial speech test should give
special weight to the risks to the general public as suggested by the
dissent in Western States.
PART II. DISTRIBUTION OF ARTICLE REPRINTS ON
UNAPPROVED USES
There has been a long and contentious debate about the extent to
which pharmaceutical companies may distribute to doctors reprints of
articles from medical journals that discuss new applications of an oth-
erwise-approved drug. FDA has recognized for many years that phy-
sicians may prescribe drugs for these new "off-label" uses as part of
the practice of medicine,3 8 and that drug companies may send doctors
reprints of articles discussing new uses upon request by a physician. 3 9
FDA objected, though, to drug companies sending the reprints to doc-
tors without a request, but lost in an initial court challenge. 4 0 FDA's
recent Reprint Guidance accepts manufacturer-initiated distributions
made in a non-promotional way.4 1
1 See id at 875-76.
38 Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for
Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503 (Aug.
15, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130). While the agency has not issued a final
rule based on the proposal, the agency refers to it as reflecting its policy. See PETER
BARTON HUTr ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 820 n. 1 (2007).
3 See HUTT ET AL., supra note 38, at 548 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,823
(Nov. 18, 1994)).
40 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998),
amended by 36 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), appeal dismissed & vacated in part sub
nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
4* U.S. FooD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, GOOD REPRINT
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR
SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED
DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009) [hereinafter GOOD
REPRINT PRACTICES], available at
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-D-0053-gdl.pdf.
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A. Earlier History
Historically, FDA has expressed its concerns that a manufactur-
er's unsolicited distribution of reprints on off-label uses would pro-
mote drugs for untested uses. During the Clinton Administration, the
agency issued a Guidance Document indicating that this distribution
could be an illegal promotion of an unapproved use of a drug. 4 2 In a
lawsuit brought by the Washington Legal Foundation, (WLF 1), a fed-
eral district court found that the Guidance unduly limited the compa-
nies' First Amendment commercial speech rights when the article
stated that the use was not approved by FDA and was not mislead-
ing.4 3
In 1997, Congress renewed the FDA's authority to impose "user
fees" on pharmaceutical companies seeking approval for new drugs
through the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
(FDAMA). FDAMA also stated the circumstances under which the
agency would not object to manufacturer-initiated article distribu-
tions.44 In part, the FDAMA required manufacturers to submit the
article to the FDA so that it could assess the need for additional dis-
closures when needed, or even a supplemental drug application for the
new use. FDA sought to have the district court reconsider its initial
injunction in WLFI in light of the legislation. Instead the district court
modified its initial injunction to find that the FDAMA provisions
were "a kind of constitutional blackmail" to induce the companies to
comply with its provisions or sacrifice their First Amendment rights.4 5
The court enjoined the agency from limiting manufacturer-initiated
distributions of article reprints when there was a disclosure that the
use was not approved and the article contained no misleading infor-
mation.4
On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the injunction without
reaching the merits of the case. The court accepted the agency's ar-
gument that the Guidance and FDAMA provisions provided a "safe
harbor" from enforcement and did not constitute an independent basis
42 See Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800, 52,801
(Oct. 8, 1996).
43 See Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d 51; Constitutionalizing, supra
note 1, at 828-32; Drug Safety, supra note 1, at 878-80.
21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b) (Supp. 111 1994). The provision was in effect for
seven years and has since lapsed by its terms.
45 Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999).
46 Id. at 87-88.
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for enforcement.4 7 The court stressed that it was not criticizing the
reasoning of the district court.48
During the Bush Administration, FDA stated that as a "matter of
policy" and for resource reasons, it was "unlikely" to bring enforce-
ment actions against distributions that complied with the lower court's
decision that had been vacated.49
B. Reprint Guidance
1. Scope of Guidance
During the Bush Administration FDA issued a Reprint Guidance,
addressing the circumstances under which manufacturer-initiated dis-
tributions would be appropriate.50 The Reprint Guidance 5' recognized
the "public health and policy justification" for allowing the dissemina-
tion of article reprints.52 Under the Guidance, the article must be from
a peer-reviewed journal, use controlled studies, and not contain mis-
leading information." In making a distribution of non-misleading
articles, the pharmaceutical company must also state that the agency
has not approved the use, and provide a bibliography of articles reach-
ing the opposite conclusion of the articles being distributed, if any
such contrary articles are in existence.
2. Criteria for Promotional Distributions
The Reprint Guidance also requires the journal article to be "dis-
tributed separately from information that is promotional in nature." 54
Thus, if a pharmaceutical sales representative delivers a reprint to a
47 Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 335-37 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Some maintain that the "FDA reversed its position" by characterizing the guidance as
merely a safe harbor. HuTr ET AL., supra note 38, at 553-54.
48 Wash. Legal Found., 202 F.3d at 337 n.7.
49 HUTT ET AL., supra note 38, at 554 (citing Letter from Margaret Dotzel,
Assoc. Comm'r for Policy, Food & Drug Admin., to Daniel J. Popeo & Richard A.
Samp, Wash. Legal Found. (Jan. 28, 2002)),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/02/JanO2/013002/01p-
0250_pdnO0 101 vol2.pdf.
50 See News Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Proposes Guidance for




51 GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 41; see also Drug Safety, supra note
1, at 880 (discussing Reprint Guidance during the Bush Administration).





physician during an office visit, promotional material may not be at-
tached to the reprint and the reprint may not be discussed during the
visit. By clear implication, the Guidance treats as "non-promotional"
the sales representative directly handing the reprint to the doctor. This
aspect of the Guidance is questionable, though, since the delivery
brings the use to the doctor's attention, and encourages the use. The
Reprint Guidance should be revised to recognize the promotional as-
pect of distributions by sales representatives. 5
3. Impact of Mass Mailings
The Reprint Guidance does not recognize the significance of
mass-distributions by manufacturers of reprints. A general mailing
brings to the doctor's attention an article that he or she might not have
read independently. Moreover, mass mailings to doctors can increase
awareness of the article and increase the level of use and potential
risks. These mass mailings have a greater impact and are appropriate-
ly an area for greater agency concern.
Furthermore, a distribution may be accompanied by a transmittal
letter from the company that could be seen as an implicit endorsement
for the new use. At a minimum, there should be a statement that the
company is not endorsing the use and the doctor should make the de-
cision solely based on medical standards.
PART III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BROADER
PROMOTIONAL TEST ON REPRINTS
The Reprint Guidance has not been changed by the Obama Ad-
ministration and remains in effect.56 This section provides an over-
view of constitutional objections that might arise if the agency were to
revise the Guidance to define distributions by sales representatives
and mass mailings by drug companies as promotional. While the med-
ical articles are educational when published in medical journals, they
assume a promotional aspect when distributed by drug companies to
doctors. Western States, discussed earlier, provides the appropriate
analytic framework.
5 In determining what is promotional, attention should be given to material
that "explains" the uses of a product, as the Supreme Court found in determining the
scope of the labeling provisions of the Act. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345
(1948).
56 The Guidance was cited by the Government in a pending case that raised a
broad commercial speech challenge to the FDA position, but which was dismissed as
part of a fraud and abuse settlement. Allergen v. FDA, No. 1:09-cv-01879-JDB
(D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2010); see Natasha Singer, Maker of Botox Settles Inquiry on Off-
label Use, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 2, 2010 at Al.
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A. Commercial Speech: Impact of Manufacturer-Initiated
Distributions
As recognized in Western States, the government has a substantial
interest in ensuring the integrity of the new drug approval system. 57
The distribution of article reprints has the potential to marginalize the
new drug approval system. If distributions are permitted, drug compa-
nies may obtain approval for the easiest use for which safety and effi-
cacy can be established, such as short-term pain relief. Once ap-
proved, manufacturers may distribute reprints on new uses for a more
serious condition that involves a longer period of use for which the
risks are more difficult to evaluate. Precluding these distributions until
the supplemental New Drug Application (NDA) is obtained would
directly advance the government's interest in ensuring the integrity of
the drug approval system.
B. More Extensive Than Necessary: Use of Disclosures
Litigants may also argue that a distribution restriction is more ex-
tensive than necessary because a disclosure about the lack of agency
approval contained within the article reprint might be viewed as an
adequate alternative. Disclosures, though, are not an adequate substi-
tute for the agency review of the adequacy of the testing. A court of
appeals rejected that alternative during a due process challenge to
FDA drug prohibitions when cancer patients sought access to experi-
mental drugs not approved by FDA. 8 A disclosure that the agency
has not approved the study serves only as boilerplate that minimizes
the agency role. The agency is an independent and expert assessor of
studies. For example, the authors of journal articles may receive fund-
ing from the pharmaceutical company. While this funding would be
disclosed with the distribution, the agency brings independence as
well as expertise to its review. The agency can also obtain full access
to all data from the clinical studies, which would permit an indepen-
dent analysis of the claim's underlying support. Journal authors and
reviewers may not have access to the same extent as the FDA.59
57 See supra Part I.B.
58 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eisenbach,
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
See Drug Safety, supra note 1, at 885-89 (identifying the need to provide
adequate disclosures).
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C. Post-Approval Risks and Need for Surveillance
Another safety reason exists for not regarding disclosures as an
adequate alternative. When FDA approves a drug, additional risks
may become apparent after the drug is administered to the general
population. The pre-market testing does not have the scope to detect
all the risks a drug may pose, as illustrated by the findings of cardi-
ovascular risks for the painkiller Vioxx after it was on the market.o
Congress has now provided for electronic surveillance of the post-
market risks, and in some cases additional testing can be required.
Drugs with new uses described in a reprint are also likely to have a
potential for post-approval risks that are not found in the testing used
to support the journal article. When a drug manufacturer distributes
these reprints, the company does not file a supplemental NDA and
thus does not pay the user fees that support surveillance of the risk
from the new off-label use. The risks that occur from the off-label use
may be reported in the general adverse risk reporting for the drug and
perhaps may be found in any ongoing electronic surveillance for the
original use, but it may be more difficult to track the new risks and
associate them with the off-label use. Merely treating these uses as a
"misuse" or a non-approved use does not capture the role of the re-
print in bringing about the risk.
CONCLUSION
Any effort to impose a tailored or general DTC moratorium or to
restrict manufacturer-initiated distributions of medical article reprints
to doctors on new uses of drugs is likely to lead to a constitutional
challenge. The underlying issue is the extent to which Congress is
limited to requiring a disclosure as the primary means to protect the
public from safety risks once a drug is approved.
Congress should be able to enact laws that provide further protec-
tions for the public. A DTC advertisement moratorium should be
permissible for drugs that have a special risk potential in order to pro-
vide time to assess the additional risks that come with widespread use.
This category includes drugs for which risk signals were seen during
clinical testing.6' Congress should also be able to require drug manu-
facturers to obtain FDA approval of new uses for existing drugs
before manufacturers may distribute medical articles through pharma-
ceutical sales representatives or general mailings to doctors. 6 2 Con-
6o See id. at 890; Dembner, supra note 3.
61 See supra Part LA, I.C.1.
62 See supra Part II.B.
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gress and the agency need to be able to protect the public from harm
and they should not be limited to a boilerplate disclosure. The scope
of Western States should be reexamined and reconsidered if it limits
the government from being able to prevent harm to the public from
prescription drugs adequately.

